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Profitability is a central concern when governments provide guarantees to increase the
flow of funds to disadvantaged groups.  We examine the profitability of small business investment
companies (SBICs) that are chartered and regulated by the U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA) to finance the activities of small firms.  We document, over the 1986-91 period, dismal
performance by SBICs.  Because SBICs have access to government-guaranteed funds, financial
distress among SBICs can expose the SBA, and hence taxpayers, to losses.  Using two alternative
sample selection models, we examine the relationship between SBICs’ use of SBA funds and
returns on equity (ROE) and survival probabilities.  The first sample selection model is based on a
model of failure/survival.  The second selection model is based on our observation that many
SBICs do not take advantage of SBA leverage:  nearly one-third of SBICs use no leverage at all,
and that figure rises to three-fifths for bank-owned SBICs.  The results from our sample selection
models indicate that SBA leverage--the amount of funds borrowed from the SBA as a percent of
private capital--reduces ROE and the probability of survival.  In addition, we find that the
probability of using SBA leverage decreases for bank-owned SBICs relative to other SBICs and
for highly profitable and efficient SBICs, while it increases for SBICs using debt to finance the
activities of small firms. Thus, our results suggest that an SBIC’s performance is negatively
correlated with SBA leverage.
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1.  Introduction
Policymakers regularly propose and endorse programs designed to encourage the flow of
funds to selected consumers and businesses.  For instance, the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) regulations aim to increase the flow of funds to disadvantaged communities or persons by
requiring depository institutions to make a minimum amount of effort to fund these groups. 
Similarly, the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 7(a) loan program and its Small Business
Investment Company program aim to encourage the flow of funds to small businesses through
government guarantees of debt issued by the small businesses and/or the financial intermediaries
providing the funds to the small businesses.  In this paper we examine the profitability of the
SBA’s small business investment companies (SBICs) over the 1986-91 period.  Because SBICs
had access to government-guaranteed funds and because these guarantees exposed the SBA and
taxpayers to losses, an evaluation of the performance of SBICs and factors that are correlated
with it is of interest to policymakers and taxpayers.
As we shall describe in more detail below, the time period we study, 1986-1991, was
characterized by very low profitability and very high failure rates of SBICs: Of our sample’s 280
SBICs operating in 1986, 89 entered liquidation by the end of 1993, and 67 had surrendered their
licenses, leaving 123, or well under half, the original sample.  This poor performance generated
significant losses to the federal government: the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated
that only $200 million of the $500 million owed by SBICs in liquidation as of September 1995
would ultimately be repaid (GAO, 1995).  What role, if any, did government-guaranteed debt of
SBICs play in their poor performance over this time period?  This paper examines this question in
detail, and thus contributes to our understanding of how credit guarantees affect the performance     See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) for a similar approach when assessing the
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impact of inheritance receipt on the profitability of the recipient's small business.
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of financial intermediaries that use them.
In previous work, we found that poor SBIC performance was associated with high usage
of SBA-guaranteed debt (“SBA leverage”) (Brewer, Genay, Jackson, and Worthington, 1996a),
and a study by the GAO (1993) reported similar findings.  We expand on this earlier work in
several ways.  First, we examine both book and market returns on equity, and we find that our
earlier results are unchanged.  Second, we estimate two alternative sample selection models;
under assumptions that we detail below, this provides consistent parameter estimates in our
profitability equations.  The first selection model is based on a model of failure/survival:  since we
can estimate the impact of SBA leverage on profitability only for those SBICs that survive over
some period of time, simple OLS coefficient estimates of leverage's effect will be inconsistent. 
Consequently, we use Heckman's procedure for obtaining consistent and efficient parameter
estimates by using maximum likelihood techniques to jointly estimate survival and profitability
equations.      Our second selection model is based on our observation that many SBICs do not
1
take advantage of SBA leverage:  nearly one-third of SBICs uses no leverage at all, and that
figure rises to 60 percent for bank-owned SBICs.  If some unobservable SBIC characteristic
affects both the choice of leverage and profitability outcomes, then OLS estimates of leverage's
impact on profitability will be inconsistent.  To address this, we again estimate a sample selection
model.  Estimates from both selection models point to a negative relationship between the extent
to which SBICs use SBA-guaranteed funds and their economic performance. 
Overall, we interpret our results as being consistent with the notions that 1) risky SBICs     For a more detailed description of the SBIC program and regulations, see Appendix A.
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are more likely to make greater use of SBA funding than are other SBICs (adverse selection); 2)
firms with government liability guarantees tend to invest excessively in risky assets (moral
hazard); 3) SBICs using debt to finance equity investments suffered from a mismatch between
income and expenses (the mismatch effect); 4)  leveraged SBICs who could not prepay their SBA
leverage when interest rates fell in the late 1980s experienced significant losses as a result (the
prepayment effect).  Assessing the relative importance of these four effects is left for future
research.
2.  The SBIC Program
2
The SBIC program was established in 1958 to encourage the provision of long-term debt
and equity capital to small firms.  SBICs fund their operations through private capital, public debt
and equity issues, and loans, and SBICs can be "stand-alone" financial intermediaries or can be
owned, completely or in part, by other financial institutions, including banks.  SBICs can issue
debentures which are purchased directly or are guaranteed by the SBA; these debentures are
typically priced 50 to 100 basis points above similar maturity Treasury securities, hence are
subsidized relative to rates paid by other (private sector) financial intermediaries raising funds. 
These debentures are usually of ten years duration, and, during the time period we study, SBICs
faced prepayment restrictions on the debentures that they issued.
Between 1958 and 1996, the SBA licensed 1,403 SBICs with approximately $2 billion in
private capital.  Over the years, the program has experienced periods of success, as well as
periods of large losses; Gompers (1994) offers a concise review of the program.  For instance,
according to the SBA, SBICs have funded such successful companies as Apple Computer, Cray     Other leverage ratios, such as total borrowings and total liabilities as percentages of total
3
assets, also indicate higher leverage at commercial banks relative to SBICs.
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Research, Federal Express, and America on Line.  In addition,  between 1983 and 1996, SBICs
funded 25,127 firms with $8.89 billion.  On the other hand, the program has also experienced very
high failure rates among SBICs and relatively large losses to the SBA.  According to SBA
statistics, between 1967 and 1996, 459 SBICs entered liquidation and had close to $1 billion in
SBA leverage outstanding at the time of liquidation.  Moreover, losses to the SBA from
liquidations appear to be significant.  For instance, the GAO (1995) estimated that only $200
million of the $500 million owed by SBICs in liquidation as of September 1995 would ultimately
be repaid.
How SBICs compare to other financial intermediaries
SBICs are both similar to and different from other financial intermediaries, including
commercial banks and venture capital firms.  Like commercial banks, SBICs lend money to small
firms and fund their investments, in part, by issuing debt.  Just as mispriced federal deposit
insurance allows commercial banks access to deposits at below market rates, SBA guarantees
allow SBICs to issue debentures at subsidized rates.  However, subsidized liabilities fund a greater
fraction of commercial banks’ assets than SBICs:  deposits averaged 78% of total assets for
banks, while SBA leverage averaged 34% of SBICs' assets over the time period we study.  
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Furthermore, commercial banks, on average, were 10 times larger than SBICs and were much
more profitable between 1986 and 1991 (figure 1).
One important difference between banks and SBICs is that while banks are severely
restricted in equity participations and provide funds to firms almost exclusively through loans,      Because banks can and do own and operate SBICs, however, banks can make equity
4
investments indirectly through their SBIC subsidiaries.
      Data on interest rates on bank loans are obtained from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms
5
of Business Lending.  The Survey is conducted four times a year and collects detailed information
on all commercial and industrial loans made during the survey week by participating banks.




SBICs make convertible debt and equity investments as well as loans.   In fact, between 1983 and
4
1996, only 19.5% of the dollar amount disbursed by SBICs were through loans; the remainder
were through debt with equity (31.1%) and straight equity (49.4%) securities (SBA, 1997).
Loans made by SBICs do appear to differ from loans made by banks.  Although the
interest rates on bank and SBIC loans are highly correlated and move in tandem over the business
cycle, the rates on SBIC loans are higher and vary less over time than do bank loan rates (figure
2).  This suggests that banks may be lending to different types of firms than SBICs or that the two
types of contracts have different characteristics.   Furthermore, firms funded by SBICs differ from
5
those funded by banks.  For instance, compared to firms sampled in the 1987 National Survey of
Small Business Finances (NSSBF), firms funded by SBICs are younger, have greater assets, more
employees, and are more likely to be organized as corporations rather than sole proprietorships or
partnerships (table 1).
Although SBICs are considered a part of the venture capital industry, they differ from
other venture capital firms in a number of ways.   First, SBICs account for only a small fraction of
6
the entire venture capital industry.  In 1991, total capital under management at SBICs accounted
for only slightly over 6% of total capital managed by the entire venture capital industry.  In
addition, SBICs provided less than 2% of the total disbursements by all venture capital firms in     While only about 7% of all funds disbursed by venture capital firms in 1991 was for LBOs and
7
acquisitions, close to 35% of funds disbursed by SBICs was for such purposes.  In addition,
between 1983 and 1992, over 56% of SBIC investments was first-time financings; in contrast,
only about 36% of all venture capital disbursements over the same period were first-round
financings.
6
the 1983-1992 period.  Second, like other venture capital firms, SBICs purchase equity securities;
yet, while venture capital firms invest mostly through convertible securities (Sahlman, 1990), the
majority of SBIC investments are straight equity.  SBIC and other venture capital firms also
appear to fund different types of firms and projects.  For instance, compared to total venture
capital investments, a greater fraction of funds disbursed by SBICs are for leveraged buy-outs,
acquisitions, and first-time financings.
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3.  Factors affecting SBIC performance
Economic models indicate that the relationship between access to subsidized funds and
performance is complicated.  At first glance, one would expect that borrowing money at a
subsidized rate would raise the returns to private investors.  If markets are efficient, then investors
will invest in subsidized institutions until their risk-adjusted (post-subsidy) rates of return equal
those available in other financial intermediaries.  This means more projects would be funded than
would be the case in a world without SBA subsidies.  However, if only the riskiest
institutions—those that would otherwise be unable to raise funds or could do so only at a hefty
risk premium— use subsidies, this adverse selection may produce a negative relationship between
financial performance and use of subsidized funds.  Similarly, if financial institutions that take
advantage of government subsidies do so because they intend to invest in riskier projects than
they would if only their own money were at stake (moral hazard), we would again observe a
negative relationship between profitability and use of subsidies.     This would be true if the mean duration of equity investments was greater than the mean
8
duration of debt investments.  Our previous research (BGJW 1996a) found little evidence of a
prepayment effect for our sample SBICs.
     The SBIC Reinvention Council (1995, p. 45) noted that under the old regulations, SBICs
9
could not prepay debentures for their first five years and that the interest rates SBICs were
permitted to charge borrowers were linked to the level of current interest rates, not the lagged
interest rates that governed the actual cost of funds to SBICs with previously selected SBA
leverage levels.  The new regulations relaxed both of these regulatory features.
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Furthermore, regulations often accompany subsidies.  Although many SBIC regulations
may have been sensible ex ante, they often exposed levered SBICs to losses arising from
unanticipated changes in their operating environment.  For instance, the SBA regulations in effect
during the period under review essentially forbade prepayment of SBA leverage during its first
five years.  Thus, falling interest rates could mean a decline in investment income but no
commensurate decline in interest expenses, putting pressure on profits.  This prepayment effect
would likely be most pronounced for SBICs with large loan portfolios.   In fact, when the SBIC
8
program's regulations were revised in 1994, this prepayment penalty was essentially eliminated, as
the SBA recognized the possible interest rate risk faced by SBICs whose liabilities were fixed
rate.   A second regulatory feature is that SBA leverage required regular interest payments to the
9
SBA, potentially creating a mismatch between assets and liabilities of SBICs.  Thus, many SBICs,
especially equity-oriented SBICs whose realized income consists primarily of variable capital
gains, may have found SBA leverage quite burdensome.  Although the prepayment and mismatch
costs were known features of SBA leverage, they nevertheless exposed SBICs to interest rate and
cash flow risks.  Overall, then, we have several reasons to expect that SBA leverage may be
negatively related to ROE and positively related to failure.8
Previous research
Several strands of the banking and finance literature are relevant for our work.  The
bank/thrift failure literature identifies factors correlated with the likelihood of failure, and the bank
performance literature, with its emphasis on exogenous factors such as market structure and on
endogenous factors such as capital/assets ratios, offers some solid evidence on factors influencing
bank profitability.
The financial institution failure literature: Research in this area has clearly shown that
diversification, asset risk, interest rate risk, and managerial efficiency measures are important
correlates of bank and thrift failure probabilities.  Previous studies range from those estimating
single equation logits or probits to those estimating two-equation systems or time-varying
proportional hazard models (for examples, see Avery and Hanweck, 1984; Barth et. al., 1985;
Brewer et. al., 1989; Cole, 1993; Gajewski, 1989; Helwege, 1996).  The GAO (1993) studied a
sample of SBICs similar to the one we examine and found that increases in SBA leverage and in
the share of equities in the SBIC’s portfolio of securities raise the likelihood of SBIC liquidation.
The bank performance literature: Many papers examine the relationship between bank
profitability and various measures of market structure and regulatory conditions (for instance,
Berger, 1995a and 1995b; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1997; Hughes et. al., 1997).  A central
issue in these studies is often characterized as the market power versus efficiency question: do
highly profitable banks earn profits because they exercise market power, or  because they are
highly efficient?  Previous studies offer evidence to support both hypotheses (see Berger (1995a)). 
Another issue in these studies, and one that is especially relevant for our study of SBA leverage, is
the relationship between capital and earnings in banking.  Berger (1995b) characterizes     The SBA's SBIC Statistical Package reports that there were 335 reporting SBICs in 1986.
10
     Specifically, the financial statements pertain to the fiscal years 1987–92.
11
9
“conventional wisdom” as pointing to a negative relationship between capital and earnings: in
perfect capital markets, a bank with a higher capital/assets ratio has, ceteris paribus, a lower
probability of failure.  Consequently, investors require a lower (after-tax) rate of return to hold
the bank’s equity.  In practice, though, data reveal a positive, not a negative, correlation between
capital and profits (Berger, 1995b; Demirguc-Kunt, 1997).  Lower expected costs of bankruptcy
associated with capital and asymmetric information between investors and bank management offer
potential explanations for the empirical evidence:  An increase in capital may raise profitability by
lowering costs of financial distress, or banks may credibly signal better quality with higher capital
ratios.  The GAO (1993) study, as well as our previous research, finds a negative correlation
between leverage and earnings, a finding similar to Berger’s, since highly levered SBICs have low
capital/assets ratios.  We will return to this issue below when we discuss our regression results.
4.  Data
We use data from 280 SBICs active at the beginning of 1986, which filed reports of both
condition and investments.   The reports of condition data provide detailed balance-sheet and
10
income-statement information of SBICs for the 1986-91 period.   We use these stock and flow
11
data to construct several measures of SBIC financial performance as well as control variables for
our analysis below.  The investments data are transactions-level records of each investment made
by every SBIC over the 1983-1992 period, and they provide details on the firm being financed,
the intended use of funds, the size and type of investment (debt, equity, or some hybrid), and
other information.10
Profitability measures  We construct both book and market values of profitability. 
Accounting-based measures of performance are used in this study because stock market-based
measures of performance are not readily available for most of the SBICs in our sample.  Several
performance measures are computed using historical cost (book value) information obtained from
reported income and balance sheet data.  Other performance measures are computed using
various adjustments to historical cost information to make them suitable measures of economic
performance.  Beside using historical cost accounting procedures to report each investment, an
SBIC is required to adjust the historical cost value of each investment by any unrealized gains or
losses embedded in the instrument (market value).  Since net unrealized gains are as reported by
an SBIC, this adjustment to historical cost values might not generate a “true” market value
measure.  Nevertheless, it provides an alternative index to examine the association between SBA
leverage and SBIC performance.  SBIC performance is captured by both return on equity (ROE)
and cumulative profitability measures (CP).  Thus, we construct book and market values of ROE
and CP.
ROE, as measured by the ratio of net earnings to equity, is perhaps the most commonly
used measure of profitability.  From the standpoint of financial theory, ROE provides a proxy for
the returns available to shareholders.  An SBIC with low earnings as a percentage of shareholder
claims is likely to experience falling share prices and therefore increased costs of external capital. 
In such a case, the company’s growth potential is likely to be lowered commensurately.  Thus,
annual ROEs offer reasonable measures of SBICs’ current performance. 
Cumulative profitability measures are employed to examine capital adequacy.  We
consider three measures: book value, market value, and a value corresponding to the measure     See Benston (1985), for a general critique of the validity of using accounting data to infer
12
economic performance.  Ronen and Sorter (1972) explain various adjustments that must be made
to both accounting earnings and balance sheet data to make accounting rates of returns suitable
measures of economic returns.
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used by the SBA to determine whether an SBIC is capital impaired.  Cumulative profitability is
defined as the ratio of accumulated, undististribued earnings (“cumulative profits”) to original
equity capital.  Because we do not have data on the dividends paid out over the SBIC’s lifetime,
the CP measures potentially understate how much the SBIC has earned over the course of its
lifetime.  Instead, our cumulative profitability measures capture “what’s left in the till” for
creditors should the firm fail overnight.  The book value measure excludes accumulated unrealized
net gains on securities held by the SBIC, while the market value measure includes such gains. 
The CP measure used by the SBA includes accumulated unrealized losses but excludes
accumulated unrealized gains.  This variable allows us to examine those factors that are likely to
lead to poor performance by SBA’s standards.
Because of the many well-known problems associated with using accounting data to
reflect economic reality, it is important to check the validity of our accounting-based variables as
measures of SBIC performance.   To obtain a measure of economic performance, we employ
12
stock market data.  Annual shareholders’ returns (RET ) were computed for the eight SBICs that i,t
had readily available stock market data over the 1986-1991 period.  Of the 48 possible firm-years
observations, we have complete data for 38.  Panel A of table 2 contains the simple Pearson
correlation coefficients for the different variables.  The sample correlation coefficients suggest
that there is a statistically significant association between RET and ROE.  The association is
stronger when market value ROE is used as the accounting performance measure.RETi,t ’ "0 % "1 ROEi,t % ,i,t
     See Jacobson (1987) and Landsman and Shapiro (1995) for a discussion of the relation
13
between accounting-based measures of performance and economic returns.
     If we allow for entry of new SBICs and recompute annual exit rates from the sample
14
including SBICs established after 1986, we find similar exit rates.
     SBICs can surrender their licenses under several circumstances.  First, two or more SBICs
15
merge directly, leading to at least one surrender.  Second, two or more parent organizations of
SBICs merge, leading the new parent to surrender at least one of the licenses.  Third, the SBIC
owners are truly exiting the industry; this latter category could be considered "failures," as we
infer that the owners felt they were not earning a competitive rate of return on their investment. 
Our sample of 280 SBICs excludes SBICs from the first category.  However, our data do not
allow us to distinguish between the second and third categories.  Consequently, we choose to
exclude all surrenders from our analysis; this does not bias our results, though it costs us some
efficiency in our estimation.
12
A model relating annual shareholders’ returns, RET, to ROE can be written as:
We estimate this equation using pooled cross-section time series data and report the results in
panel B of table 2.  The results indicate a positive and significant correlation between accounting
returns and stock market returns.  This is consistent with the conclusions found in other studies
using a much larger number of observations than that employed here.   Thus, these results
13
suggest that information contained in accounting-based measures of performance can be used to
provide insights into the economic performance of SBICs.
Failure rates  Table 3 shows how our sample of 280 SBICs fared over the 1986-1993
time period.  Less than half of our sample, 43.9%, remained by the end of 1993, with liquidations
and surrenders of license accounting for about three-fifths and two-fifths, respectively, of all the
exits.   In this paper, we treat liquidations as failures, and our sample excludes SBICs who
14
ultimately surrender their licenses.   The SBA typically places an SBIC in liquidation because of
15     Transactions-oriented projects include plant modernization, debt consolidation, new building
16
or plant, machinery acquisition, and land acquisition projects.  Relationship-oriented projects
include acquisition of existing businesses, marketing, research and development, and all other
(unspecified) projects. Operating capital is the excluded category.
13
regulatory violations, often including poor financial performance that has left the SBIC
undercapitalized.  However, not all liquidations are SBA-initiated: the GAO (1993) reports that
between 1986 and 1991, several SBICs voluntarily entered liquidation to avoid penalties for
prepaying the long-term SBA leverage they owed.  Consequently, we view liquidations as both
economic and regulatory events, in which liquidation is likely to follow poor financial
performance but need not do so.
Asset risk measures Our measures include several financial indicators commonly used in
the bank/thrift failure literature: the ratio of loans to total portfolio securities at book value;
Herfindahl indexes of investments, based on industry and geographical groupings; and measures
of size and age of the small firms being funded by the SBIC.  We also include three additional
variables in this category: the shares of SBIC investments going to “relationship-oriented”
projects, to “transactions-related” projects, and to firms located in the same state as the SBIC.  
16
We expect SBICs with high shares of relationship-oriented investments to have higher asset risk,
hence higher (ex ante) rates of return and higher failure rates.
Lagged profitability, capital, and leverage Since we are primarily interested in the impact
of SBA leverage on profitability, all of our regressions include a leverage measure, either the ratio
of leverage to total assets or the ratio of leverage to private capital.  We also include a lagged
measure of cumulative profitability, which we defined above as the ratio of accumulated,
undistributed earnings to original equity capital.   We do not include a capital/assets ratio in our14
regressions, because of its large (in absolute value) correlation with both of our leverage
measures.
Other variables We include a measure of managerial efficiency, the ratio of operating
expenses to total assets, as well as SBIC age and size as simple control variables.  Some of our
specifications also include year dummies and regional dummies based on the SBIC’s state of
operation.  Other specifications exclude the time dummies but include other variables which vary
by year, not by SBIC.  For instance, in some specifications, we include the number of SBIC exams
performed by the SBA in each year.  Further, some specifications include a measure of the
economic conditions faced by SBICs, the investment share-weighted average small business
failure rate.  We construct the failure rate, which is originally available by year and state, by using
each SBIC’s investment records to compute the flow of dollars going to each of the 50 states in
each year, and then share-weighting the state and year-specific failure rates.  In several
specifications below, we use identifying characteristics of the SBICs to identify our equations.  In
particular, we use the legal form of the SBIC (corporation or partnership), bank ownership of the
SBIC, and public or private status in several of our models.
Summary statistics  Tables 4 and 5 contain some descriptive statistics of our data.  Table
4, which describes the liability structure of SBICs, shows that about two-thirds of SBICs use SBA
leverage, with the rate falling to about 40% for bank-owned SBICs.  Table 4 shows clearly that
most debt owed by SBICs was long-term debt, and most of this took the form of SBA leverage. 
That is, SBICs borrowed essentially no funds except for those guaranteed by the SBA.  Table 5
reports the simple means and standard deviations for the variables used in the paper.  We report
these statistics for two samples.  The first, which includes 1197 records on 280 SBICs between15
1986 and 1991, is the set of SBIC-year observations for which we have financial records filed. 
The second, which includes 889 records, is formed from the first in several steps.  First, we
eliminate all SBICs who ultimately surrender their licenses; second, we drop records pertaining to
the year before failure; third, we drop records in which the profitability measures are in the 1%
tails of the distribution; and finally, we drop a small number of records for which needed variables
are missing or incomplete.
5.  Methodology
In our previous work, we used simple OLS equations to describe the relationship between
SBIC profitability, SBA leverage, and other variables.  We also estimated the probability of failure
with probit models as well.  In this paper, we consider several alternative econometric
specifications to better address issues of sample selection.  We organize our discussion along two
distinct lines of concern.  First, we consider the selection problems posed by the fact that many of
our SBICs fail (exit from the industry) over our sample period.  If some unobservable
characteristic of SBICs influences both the profitability of SBICs as well as the likelihood of
survival over some period of time, then OLS estimates from a regression of profitability on
leverage and other independent variables will be inconsistent.  Second, we consider the problems
that arise if SBICs' choice of leverage is correlated with profitability, again perhaps through some
unobservable variable.  For both models, we estimate selection models to consistently estimate the
coefficient on leverage in the profitability equations.
The survival/failure issue
We model profitability, A, as follows:(1) Ait%2 ’ Xit# % ,it
(2) y
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     If, instead, we estimated our model on a one-year ahead basis, any selection model we
17
estimate would be faulty, since we would count as failures in year t+1 SBICs who, in fact,
survived through year t+1 and subsequently failed in year t+2.
16
where X  are correlates of profitability, and where we assume that g  is distributed normally, with it it
mean 0 and variance  .  When SBICs fail, they leave our dataset; however, we also tend to
"lose" SBICs one year before failure, perhaps due to irregular reporting practices at troubled
SBICs.  Consequently, we structure our dataset so as to estimate profitability at time t+2 as a
function of independent variables at time t.  
17
Turning now to the survival process, we let   denote SBIC i's net worth at time t+2,
which we model as follows:
where W  are correlates of net worth (including some, perhaps all, of X ).  True net worth is, of it it
course, unobservable; instead, we observe whether or not an SBIC survives between time periods
t and t+2:
We assume that u  is distributed normally, with mean 0 and variance  .  If   and u  are it it
correlated, then OLS estimates of % will be inconsistent.  We would expect to see such a     See Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) for a similar approach.
18
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correlation if, for example, the most poorly managed SBICs, or the SBICs most likely to make
risky investments, are those most likely to fail and to experience low profitability while still in
operation.  To address this possiblity, we try two approaches.  First, we estimate the selection
model given by equations (1) and (3), as suggested by Heckman (1976) and others.    Note that
18
equation (3) is estimated over our full sample, while equation (1) is estimated only for surviving
SBICs (since we obviously do not have observations on profits at time t+2 for SBICs that fail
between time t and time t+2).  To estimate this system, we need to specify X  and W .  As is well- it it
known, if these sets of variables are identical, then we obtain identification only through
functional form, which, in our decidedly nonstructual model would be inappropriate.  Instead, we
let W  include all of X , plus an additional four variables that we believe are likely to affect failure it it
but not profitability:   whether the SBIC is owned by a bank; whether the SBIC is publicly held;
whether the SBIC is a corporation or a partnership; and the number of exams conducted by the
SBA in each year.  We choose these variables because failure in this model is, at least in part, a
regulatory event as well as an economic one.  Consequently, whether an SBIC fails, i.e., whether
the SBA takes a particular regulatory action, may depend on certain legal characteristics of the
SBIC and on how many resources the SBA devoted to examining SBICs.
The endogeneity of SBA leverage
In this specification, we consider the possibility that only the "worst" SBICs, i.e., those
most likely to invest in high-risk assets and/or behave recklessly, decide to use SBA leverage, and
those are the very SBICs whose observed profitability may be lowest.  As in the survival/failure
model, failing to control for this correlation between leverage and profitability will bias the(4)
zit ’ 1 if SBICi has any SBA leverage outstanding at time t
zit ’ 0 otherwise
(1)) Ait ’ Xit# % ,it
(5) Prob(Zit ’ 1) ’ 1 & F(&Sit!)
18
coefficient on leverage in equation (1).  We model leverage choice as a binomial choice variable:  
We also alter slightly the timing structure of our model, allowing time t profitability to be a
function of X .  Our complete model is given by equations (1)' and (5): it
where F( ) is the normal distribution function, and S  are correlates of the leverage choice it
variable.  We estimate this system by estimating a probit on equation (5); computing the implied
inverse Mills ratios (IMRs); and estimating equation (1)' by least squares, where we include the
IMRs as regressors.  Note that both equations are estimated over the full sample of SBICs (i.e.,
those that use leverage and those that do not).  As in the survival/failure model, we restrict X  and it
S  to identify the parameters.  In particular, we let S  include all of X  plus the three SBIC legal it it it
and ownership characteristics mentioned earlier in the paper.
6.  Results and discussion
We turn first to the results of estimating the model given by equations (1) and (3),
considering book ROE (Table 6) and market ROE (Table 7) in turn.  We include regional
dummies and year dummies in all of our profitability regressions.  The survival selection
equations, however, include the regional dummies only, since one of the variables we expect to19
affect survival (but not ROE) is the number of SBIC exams conducted by the SBA, a variable that
varies only over time, not across SBICs.  The book and market ROE results are qualitatively
similar, so for brevity, we focus on the book ROE results of Table 6.  First, the cumulative profits
measure is insignificant and has the wrong sign in the profits equation but is “well-behaved” in the
survival selection equation: cumulative profitability at time t-2 tells us nothing about time t returns
on equity, but tells us much about the likelihood of the SBIC’s survival through the end of time t.
Second, note the asset risk measures produce mixed results.  High ratios of loans to total
portfolio securities raise ROE and the probability of survival.  If we view loans made by SBICs as
safer than their equity investments, then this result has the flavor of Berger's (1995b) result: 
although safer assets should require lower rates of return in equilibrium, here we find the
opposite.  The Herfindahl indices, which rise as portfolio diversification decreases, do not enter
the profits equation significantly.  In the survival equation, these indices are significant, with the
geographical index entering positively and the industry-based index entering negatively.  In other
words, industrial diversification raises survival prospects, while geographic diversification hurts
them.  The variable measuring the share of investments going to an SBIC’s home state enters the
profits equation positively though not significantly, and increases in this share lower the
probability of survival.  This result seems in conflict with the geographically-based Herfindahl
index:  geographic diversification lowers survival prospects, but so do increases in the share of
investments going locally.  The variables reflecting the types of projects ultimately funded by the
SBICs do not enter either equation significantly.  The average age of the small firms funded enters
negatively and significantly; funding older firms, on average, lowers returns on equity.  The size of
the small firms that are funded is insignificant.20
Finally, we turn to the leverage variable, the ratio of SBA leverage to private capital,
which enters negatively and significantly in both the profits and survival equations.  As we
discussed above, our leverage measure is highly negatively correlated with the capital asset ratio,
which previous studies found to be positively related to earnings for banks.  Hence, some of our
results are likely to be due to this simple leverage effect, not necessarily a subsidized leverage
effect coming through the use of (underpriced) SBA leverage.
The variables we hypothesize to affect the probability of survival but not to influence
profitability (the SBIC organizational form variables and the number of SBIC exams conducted by
the SBA) do not perform particularly well.  None is significant viewed alone, reflecting the low
simple correlations between ROE and these variables. 
We now turn to the results of estimating the selection model given by equations (1)' and
(5).  Table 8 reports the coefficient estimates and standard errors from estimating a probit on
equation (5), where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if an SBIC uses any SBA leverage
and a value of 0 otherwise.  Because we have little to guide us in selecting regressors for this
equation, we take an agnostic approach and include all of the regressors from the ROE equations
above, plus the three SBIC organizational form variables we used in the survival selection model. 
The first specification, reported in the first two columns of the table, includes book value
cumulative profitability (CP) as a regressor, while the second specification, reported in columns 3
and 4, includes instead market value CP.  Both specifications reveal that the probability of using
SBA leverage falls for bank-owned SBICs relative to other SBICs, as the simple figures in Table
4 suggest.    This implies that banks establish and operate SBICs not to obtain subsidized leverage
but for some other reason;  the obvious candidate is SBICs' ability to make equity investments in       We do find (but do not report) a significant negative coefficient on SBA leverage when
19
leverage is measured as a percentage of assets, rather than private capital.
21
small firms, an activity that is severely restricted for commercial banks.
Other variables also influence the likelihood that an SBIC uses SBA leverage:  highly
profitable and efficient SBICs are less likely to use leverage.   Furthermore, debt-oriented SBICs
are more likely to use leverage than others.  Thus, the "mismatch" story of why leverage could
diminish profitability is not very compelling:  SBICs with high ratios of loans to total portfolio
securities are more likely to use leverage than more "equity-oriented" SBICs, indicating that they
take into account potential cash flow implications of SBA leverage.
We use these probit estimates to generate inverse Mills ratios (IMRs) and then include the
IMRs as regressors in our ROE equations.  Before reviewing the selection model results,
however, we comment briefly on the results of estimating equation (1)' using simple OLS; these
estimates are contained in the first two columns of Table 9 and Table 10 for book ROE and
market ROE, respectively.  Leverage's effect on ROE is negative in both cases, but it is
statistically significant only for market ROE.
The selection model results are in the third and fourth columns of Tables 9 and 10.  The
results show that, once we take account of the correlation between the errors of the SBA leverage
choice equation and the profitability equation, increases in leverage decrease profitability, though
the effect is not significant at conventional levels.   The IMR enters negatively in both equations
19
but is significant only for market ROE.  Both the book ROE and market ROE results indicate that
ROE rises with increases in contemporaneous CP and that ROE falls with increases in the
investment share-weighted small business failure rate and the ratio of operating expenses to total      These results, where either the share of loans in the securities portfolio or one of the other
20
asset risk measures are significantly correlated with profitability, is consistent with our previous
results on security choice of SBICs (Brewer, Genay, Jackson, and Worthington, 1996b).  The
results of that study indicate that SBICs’ choice of debt versus equity investment in a small firm is
significantly correlated with the type of project being funded and the characteristics of the small
firm receiving the funds.
      Any differences between the results of our two selection models in the significance and sign
21
of the coefficients arise from two sources.  First, the timing of variables in the models are
different.  In the survival selection model, we explain profits at time t+2 with correlates at time t. 
On the other hand, in the leverage selection model, we model time t profits as a function of time t
variables.  Second, while the survival selection model examines profitability of SBICs in the 1986-
1989 period, the SBA leverage selection model examines profitability in the 1986-1991 period. 
To the extent that the relationship between profitability and its correlates are different in the two
periods, the two models would produce different results.
22
assets.  The performance of the other asset risk variables, control variables, and dummy variables
differs between the two ROE measures.  For book ROE, the share of investments in relationship-
oriented projects enters positively and significantly (at 10% level), as does SBIC size.  For market
ROE, the share of loans in the securities portfolio is positively correlated with profitability;
however,  no other asset risk variable is significant at conventional levels.
20
To summarize, our results show a significant negative correlation between SBA leverage
and profitability (and probability of survival) of SBICs under alternative selection models. 
Furthermore, SBIC profitability is significantly correlated with efficiency.  Under certain




In this paper we examined the profitability of the SBA’s small business investment
companies (SBICs) over the 1986-91 period.  We examined both book and market returns on
equity and estimated two alternative sample selection models: one based on survival, the other
based on use of SBA leverage.  Estimates from both selection models point to a negative
relationship between the extent to which SBICs use SBA-guaranteed funds and their economic
performance. 
Several factors may account for the negative relationship between SBA leverage and
profitability of SBICs: moral hazard and adverse selection problems associated with access to
subsidized funds, mismatch between the liabilities and assets of SBICs that use SBA leverage, and
prepayment restrictions that were in effect during the period under study. A natural extension of
the current study is to differentiate between these alternative, although not mutually exclusive,
explanations for our results.
 We plan to extend our current analysis in a number of ways.  First, we will investigate
alternative econometric specifications to check the robustness of our results.  For example, we
can consider fixed-effects regressions of profitability, or we can use instrumental-variables
techniques to address issues related to endogenous SBA leverage use.  Second, we wish to
distinguish more carefully between the effect of SBA leverage as simple leverage (that is, debt in
the capital structure) versus the effect arising from underpricing of the leverage.  At present, we
leave this issue for future research.24
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Appendix A:  Description of the SBIC program
The SBIC program was established with the passage of the Small Business Investment Act
of 1958.  The goal of the program is to encourage the provision of long-term funds to small firms. 
In the following, we describe the regulations in effect during the 1986-1991 period.  As noted at
the end of the appendix, the SBIC program was modified extensively in 1994; those changes are
described briefly at the end of the appendix.  During the period studied in this paper, small
business was defined to be a firm with net worth less than $6 million and average after-tax
earnings of less than $2 million.  With only a few exceptions, any person or organization that
meets the SBA’s minimum capital and other licensing requirements can be approved to establish
an SBIC.  Although the minimum capital requirement to start an SBIC has increased over time,
the requirement in 1991 was $2.5 million.
In return for focusing their investments to small businesses, SBICs are eligible to receive
SBA leverage at favorable terms equal to 300 percent of their private capital.  Under certain
circumstances, private capital can be levered up to 400 percent with SBA funds; however, until
1994, the maximum amount of SBA funds an SBIC could receive was $35 million.  As noted in
the paper, SBICs can obtain SBA funds by issuing debentures directly to the SBA or by issuing
SBA-guaranteed debentures to third parties.  The interest rates on SBA-guaranteed debt are
typically 50 to 100 basis points above the interest rates on Treasuries of comparable maturity. 
In addition to the regulations noted in the paper, SBICs are subject to other forms of
supervision and regulation.  SBICs cannot invest in certain sectors (such as unimproved real
estate, finance and investment companies, or foreign firms) and, in general, they cannot provide
short-term financing.  If an SBIC makes an equity investment in a small firm, it cannot acquire a      If an SBIC provides a plan for divestiture, it can maintain a controlling interest in a small
22
business up to seven years.
      Under banking regulations,  a bank can purchase only up to 5 percent of the equity of any
23
one firm;  an SBIC, even if it is affiliated with a banking organization, can acquire up to 49.9
percent of the equity of any one small business.
      Limits on interest rates that can be charged to small businesses are effective for all SBICs,
24
whether or not they receive SBA leverage. Also, see footnote 9 in the paper.
28
controlling interest without a plan of divestiture.    SBICs owned by banking organizations face
22
the same regulations on equity investments as other SBICs.   The SBA also places restrictions on
23
the maturity and interest rate of loans made by SBICs.  The minimum maturity allowed is five
years; the maximum interest rate that can be charged to small businesses is based on the interest
rate on debentures issued by the SBICs.
24
SBICs are subject to annual examinations by the SBA and certain reporting requirements. 
In addition to oversight regulations, SBICs using SBA leverage are subject to minimum
performance requirements.  The SBA determines that an SBIC has serious financial problems if
the sum of its net realized losses plus net unrealized losses on securities held exceeds 50 percent
of its capital.  If an SBIC is "capitally impaired" by this test, the SBA gives the firm an
opportunity to correct its weak capital condition.  If the SBIC fails to correct the capital
impairment or defaults on its payments, the entire SBA debt may be declared immediately payable
by the SBA.  Under these circumstances, or if there is another violation of the loan agreement or
any agreement with the SBA, the SBIC is liquidated or its license is revoked by the SBA.
There are two types of SBICs: regular SBICs examined in this study and specialized
SBICs (SSBICs) that provide funds solely to small businesses owned by economically or socially
disadvantaged persons.  Compared to regular SBICs, SSBICs are subject to smaller capital29
requirements and less stringent regulations on their investments.  Furthermore, SSBICs can obtain
more SBA leverage at lower interest rates.  However, SSBICs are smaller and less profitable than
regular SBICs.
After experiencing substantial losses in the SBIC program, in 1994 the SBA established
new regulations to improve the performance of SBICs and increase the flow of funds to small
firms.  Under the new rules, SBICs are eligible to issue not only SBA-guaranteed debentures, but
also participating securities that are structured like preferred stock.  Furthermore, the maximum
amount of SBA leverage an SBIC can obtain was raised to $90 million.  However, SBICs also
face higher capital requirements.  Currently, minimum capital requirements are $5 million; if an
SBIC intends to use participating securities, the minimum requirement is $10 million.  Size
definitions also increased; SBICs can finance firms with net worth under $18 million and average
after-tax earnings of less than $6 million in the past two years. 
Since the establishment of new regulations, the SBA’s budget for funding SBICs has
increased significantly.  During the period we examine in the paper, the SBA had the highest level
of funding in 1990 with $295.4 million.  In contrast, the 1997 budget was $667.4, more than
double the amount in 1990.  SBA’s funding of SBICs has increased commensurately with its
budget: in 1986, the SBA provided $136 million to regular SBICs; in 1996, SBA funding had
increased to $481.2 million, including $93.3 million in commitments.  At the same time, SBICs
appear to perform better since 1994.  According to the SBA (1997), the weighted average return
in the SBIC program was 12.98 percent in the 1992-1996 period, increasing from 9.77% in the      The differences in the rates of return reported by the SBA and those reported in this paper
25
are due to differences in aggregate book value ROE for all SBICs and average ROEs.
30
1986-1991 period.
25Table 1  Small firms funded by SBICs, 1983-1992
Distributions of firms that are financed by SBICs in the 1983-1992 period and firms surveyed in the 1987
National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF).




































Sole proprietorhip 40.0 2.2
Percentage of firms in the 1987 NSSBF sample; source: Federal Reserve.
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 Percentage of dollars disbursed by SBICs to firms with given characteristics over the 1983-1992 period; source:
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Table 2  The association between accounting-based measures of performance and stock market returns
Panel A:  Pearson correlation coefficients between SBICs stock market returns and accounting returns
This part of the table provides sample correlation coefficients between accounting-based measure of returns
and stock market returns.  RET is the stock return of an SBIC; ROEBOOK is the book value measure of
ROE computed using historical cost accounting procedures and is equal to (NII + RGNS)/(CAPTOT -
URZG); and ROEMKT is the market value measure of ROE computed by adjusting historical cost
accounting data for any unrealized gains or losses embedded in the SBIC’s portfolio and is equal to (NII +
RGNS +URZG)/(CAPTOT - URZG + URZGE).  NII is net investment income; RGNS is realized gains or
losses on securities sold; CAPTOT is total capital, including unrealized gains or losses on securities held
(URZG); and URZGE is the unrealized appreciation on securities held.
RET   ROEBOOK     ROEMKT    
1.000          0.3883     0.6664    
* **
            1.0000          0.3359    
*
         1.0000
            
Notes:  *  significance at the 5 percent level.
**significance at the 1 percent level. 
Panel B:  Simple regression of accounting returns on stock market returns
This part of the table reports the results of es timating the following model using annual data over the 1986-1991
sample period:
where RET  is stock return of the SBIC i in tim e period t, ROE  is a measure of the accounting return on equity, i,t i,t
and ,  is a stochastic error term.  The two accounting returns on equity are ROEBOOK and ROEMKT. i,t
Accounting return Coefficient  p-value
ROEBOOK 0.2774 0.0160
ROEMKT 0.7823 0.0001
Note:  This table reports on the association between  accounting performance measures and SBICs’ stock returns.
The sample consists of 8 SBICs with publicly-traded common stock between 1986 and 1991.  Annual stoc k
returns are calculated using daily stock returns.  Of the 48 possible firm-years observations, we have complete
data for 38.Table 3  Exit frequencies of SBICs, 1986-1993
Year Survive Surrender Liquidate Revoke Total Total as %
License Assets License
1986 280 - - - - -
1987 263 5 12 0 17 6.1
1988 230 17 16 0 33 12.5
1989 209 9 12 0 21 9.1
1990 175 14 20 0 34 16.3
1991 154 10 11 0 21 12.0
1992 139 6 9 0 15 9.7
1993 123 6 9 1 16 11.5
totals 123 67 89 1 157
Note:  For SBICs reporting both a liquidation and a surrender date, the earliest date is used to determine the
exit type.  In general, liquidations precede surrenders of licences.  In four cases, liquidation and surrender are
reported on the same date:  three in 1987 and one in 1988.  We label the exit type as liquidations in these
cases.  The last column is computed as the total number of exits as a percent of the previous year's survivors. 
Our dataset "loses" SBICs in the year of exit, and many failing SBICs disappear the year before failure as
well.  We have the following numbers of financial records, by year, 1986-1991:  280, 235, 216, 183, 157,
and 126.
  Table 4  Liability structure of SBICs, 1986-1991
All Bank-owned Nonbank-owned
SBICs SBICs SBICs
% of SBICs using SBA leverage 69.7 39.5 87.4
Mean ratio of SBA leverage to total assets
Unconditional 0.342 0.161 0.449
Conditional 0.491 0.407 0.513
Mean ratio of SBA leverage to private capital
Unconditional 1.050 0.376 1.446
Conditional 1.507 0.952 1.654
Mean ratio of long-term debt to total assets
Unconditional 0.317 0.150 0.414
Conditional 0.452 0.372 0.474
Mean ratio of long-term debt to total debt
Unconditional 0.605 0.361 0.733
Conditional 0.820 0.783 0.830
Mean ratio of long-term SBA leverage to long-term debt
Unconditional 0.964 0.938 0.971
Conditional 0.984 0.989 0.982
Note:  statistics are computed over the pooled cross-section time series of 280 SBICs, 1986-1991; number of
observations = 1197.  Conditional means are computed over only those SBICs reporting positive amounts of
SBA leverage outstanding.Table 5  Summary statistics 1986-1991
Mean Std Mean Std
Return on equity, book -.037 1.19 -.011 .248
Return on equity, market -.056 .852 -.028 .288
Cumulative profitability, book .094 .706 .099 .450
Cumulative profitability, market .318 1.08 .320 .733
SBA leverage/private capital 1.05 1.03 1.14 1.04
SBA leverage/total assets .342 .278 .359 .267
Operating expenses/total assets .042 .049 .038 .035
Loans/total securities .377 .400 .372 .390
Herfindahl index, by state .693 .231 .674 .231
Herfindahl index, by industry .528 .252 .499 .245
Share to transactions uses .210 .306 .210 .302
Share to relationship uses .200 .296 .214 .302
Share to instate firms .556 .338 .544 .330
Share-wted mean age of firms 7.70 8.83 7.68 8.63
Share to firms < 50 employees .653 .354 .641 .355
Log (total assets of SBIC) 15.48 1.35 15.69 1.34
Age of SBIC 12.37 9.24 12.73 9.24
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate 99.28 53.4 96.74 50.91
Owned by bank .370 - .379 -
Publicly held .123 - .117 -
Corporation .822 - .813 -
# of SBIC exams by SBA 308.3 - 299.6 -
Number of observations 1197 889
Note:  The sample of 1197 observations includes all 280 SBICs, 1986-1991. The smaller sample excludes records if they pertain to an SBIC
that ultimately surrenders its license; if the SBIC fails in the next calendar year; if the return on equity variables fall in the 1% tails of the
relevant distribution; or if any of the other variables of this table are missing.Table 6  Book return on equity 1986-1989, survival selection model estimates
Dependent variable = return on
equity, book, time t + 2 Survival selection equation
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Cumulative profitability, book -.007 .030 1.87 .388
a
SBA leverage/private capital -.039 .014 -.548 .126
a a
Operating expenses/total assets -1.27 .411 -6.25 2.83
a b
Loans/total securities .125 .041 -.055 .339
a
Herfindahl index, by state -.047 .100 1.56 .850
c
Herfindahl index, by industry .051 .069 -1.45 .586
b
Share to transactions uses .036 .041 .417 .411
Share to relationship uses .044 .043 .246 .414
Share to instate firms .094 .062 -1.01 .573
c
Share-wted mean age of firms -.004 .001 .028 .020
a
Share to firms < 50 employees .032 .038 -.311 .353
Log (total assets of SBIC) .040 .012 -.022 .110
a
Age of SBIC .002 .001 .000 .013
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate -.001 .000 -.005 .002
c
Owned by bank no -.188 .274
Publicly held no -.114 .300
Corporation no .368 .255
# of SBIC exams by SBA no .001 .001
year dummies yes no
regional dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Log likelihood -112.12
Number of observations 557
Note:  estimates are from joint maximum likelihood estimation of the profitability equation (1) and the selection (survival) equation (3).  
Dummy  variables are included in the regressions as noted in the table, though their coefficient estimates are not reported.   Sample includes
SBICs that survive and those that enter liquidation; observations pertaining to the year before liquidation or to SBICs that ultimately surrender
their licenses are omitted.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance levels .01, .05, and .10, respectively.Table 7  Market return on equity 1986-1989, survival selection model estimates
Dependent variable = return on
equity, market, time t + 2 Survival selection equation
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Cumulative profitability, market -.020 .020 1.23 .299
a
SBA leverage/private capital -.031 .015 -.575 .121
b a
Operating expenses/total assets -1.20 .440 -5.86 2.86
a b
Loans/total securities .102 .043 .455 .327
b
Herfindahl index, by state -.094 .106 1.75 .860
b
Herfindahl index, by industry .056 .073 -1.33 .588
b
Share to transactions uses .061 .044 .555 .419
Share to relationship uses .009 .046 .180 .406
Share to instate firms .059 .066 -1.15 .569
b
Share-wted mean age of firms -.002 .001 .025 .020
Share to firms < 50 employees -.057 .040 -.347 .344
Log (total assets of SBIC) .023 .013 -.063 .118
c
Age of SBIC .004 .002 .002 .013
b
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate -.000 .000 -.006 .002
a
Owned by bank no .191 .264
Publicly held no -.227 .291
Corporation no .376 .251
# of SBIC exams by SBA no .001 .001
year dummies yes no
regional dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Log likelihood -149.30
Number of observations 557
Note:  estimates are from joint maximum likelihood estimation of the profitability equation (1) and the selection (survival) equation (3). 
Dummy  variables are included in the regressions as noted in the table, though their coefficient estimates are not reported.   Sample includes
SBICs that survive and those that enter liquidation; observations pertaining to the year before liquidation or to SBICs that ultimately surrender
their licenses are omitted.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance levels .01, .05, and .10, respectively.Table 8  Determinants of SBA leverage use 1986-1991
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Cumulative profitability, book -.778 .158 no
a
Cumulative profitability, market no -.193 .098
b
Operating expenses/total assets -.997 1.77 -.635 1.78
Loans/total securities .930 .233 .710 .224
a a
Herfindahl index, by state .300 .573 .548 .556
Herfindahl index, by industry -1.90 .381 -2.09 .373
a a
Share to transactions uses .304 .248 .160 .241
Share to relationship uses .179 .223 .119 .217
Share to instate firms -.769 .350 -.864 .345
b b
Share-wted mean age of firms -.005 .007 -.002 .007
Share to firms < 50 employees .034 .200 .044 .196
Log (total assets of SBIC) .290 .069 .241 .070
a a
Age of SBIC -.014 .008 -.019 .008
c b
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate -.001 .002 -.001 .002
Owned by bank -1.86 .167 -1.96 .166
a a
Publicly held -.014 .197 .003 .194
Corporation -.058 .199 -.094 .196
year dummies yes yes
regional dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Log likelihood -281.88 -293.04
Pseudo R squared .45 .43
Number of observations 889 889
Note:  Estimates are from probit estimation of the leverage use equation (5).  Dummy  variables are included in the regressions as noted in the
table, though their coefficient estimates are not reported.   Sample includes SBICs that survive and those that enter liquidation; observations
pertaining to the year before liquidation or to SBICs that ultimately surrender their licenses are omitted.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance levels .01, .05, and .10, respectively.Table 9  Book return on equity 1986-1991, leverage use selection model
Dependent variable = return on equity, book, time t
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Cumulative profitability, book .207 .019 .218 .021
a a
SBA leverage/private capital -.010 .009 -.014 .009
Operating expenses/total assets -1.15 .221 -1.14 .221
a a
Loans/total securities .050 .026 .033 .029
c
Herfindahl index, by state .049 .062 .046 .062
Herfindahl index, by industry -.004 .044 .015 .047
Share to transactions uses .034 .027 .033 .027
Share to relationship uses .048 .027 .049 .027
c c
Share to instate firms .012 .040 .024 .041
Share-wted mean age of firms -.001 .001 -.001 .001
Share to firms < 50 employees -.034 .025 -.031 .025
Log (total assets of SBIC) .019 .008 .019 .008
b b
Age of SBIC -.001 .001 -.001 .001
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate -.001 .000 -.001 .000
a a
year dummies yes yes
regional dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Inverse Mills ratio no -.026 .020
Adjusted R squared .28 .28
Number of observations 889 889
Note:  Inverse Mill ratio is constructed from estimates of Table 8, columns 1 and 2.  Dummy  variables are included in the regressions as noted
in the table, though their coefficient estimates are not reported.  Estimates are from least squares estimation of the profitability equation (1)'. 
Sample includes SBICs that survive and those that enter liquidation; observations pertaining to the year before liquidation or to SBICs that
ultimately surrender their licenses are omitted.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance levels .01, .05, and .10, respectively.Table10  Market return on equity 1986-1991, leverage use selection model
Dependent variable = return on equity, market, time t
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
estimate error estimate error
Cumulative profitability, market .123 .015 .124 .015
a a
SBA leverage/private capital -.020 .010 -.018 .011
b
Operating expenses/total assets -1.33 .269 -1.33 .269
a a
Loans/total securities .138 .032 .147 .034
a a
Herfindahl index, by state -.009 .076 -.007 .076
Herfindahl index, by industry .031 .054 .018 .057
Share to transactions uses .052 .033 .051 .033
Share to relationship uses .042 .033 .041 .033
Share to instate firms .025 .048 .016 .050
Share-wted mean age of firms -.000 .001 -.000 .001
Share to firms < 50 employees -.051 .030 -.053 .030
c c
Log (total assets of SBIC) .012 .009 .011 .009
Age of SBIC -.001 .001 -.002 .001
Share-wted mean sml bus failure rate -.000 .000 -.000 .000
year dummies yes yes
regional dummies yes yes
Constant yes yes
Inverse Mills ratio no .016 .024
Adjusted R squared .21 .21
Number of observations 889 889
Note:  Inverse Mill ratio is constructed from estimates of Table 8, columns 3 and 4.  Dummy  variables are included in the regressions as noted
in the table, though their coefficient estimates are not reported.  Estimates are from least squares estimation of the profitability equation (1)'. 
Sample includes SBICs that survive and those that enter liquidation; observations pertaining to the year before liquidation or to SBICs that
ultimately surrender their licenses are omitted.  Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance levels .01, .05, and .10, respectively.